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Abstract
To ensure the security and privacy of patient electronic medical information stored on local workstations in doctors’
oﬃces, clinic centers, etc., it is necessary to implement a secure and reliable method for logging on and accessing
this information. Biometrically-based identiﬁcation technologies use measurable personal properties (physiological or
behavioral) such as a ﬁngerprint in order to identify or verify a person’s identity, and provide the foundation for highly
secure personal identiﬁcation, veriﬁcation and/or authentication solutions. The use of biometric devices (ﬁngerprint
readers) is an easy and secure way to log on to the system. We have provided practical tests on HP notebooks that have
the ﬁngerprint reader integrated. Successful/failed logons have been monitored and analyzed, and calculations have been
made. This paper presents the false rejection rates, false acceptance rates and failure to acquire rates.
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1 Introduction
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA), which was designed to ensure the
security and privacy of personal health information,
aﬀects all areas of the health care. If digital (radi-
ology) images (any kind of images, e.g., CT images
or thermograms) are locally stored at workstations,
they must be secured against the misuse. Nowa-
days, digital images and reports are distributed and
accessed by authorized persons (clinicians, technolo-
gists, etc.) throughout the doctor’s oﬃces and/or by
health care providers. Thus, appropriate access con-
trol, authorization and subsequent audit trails are
critical [1, 2].
Common problems in securing access to patient
medical information (digital images or thermograms,
medical reports, and other digital data) include pass-
words and other sophisticated user identiﬁcation
and/or authentication methods, such as smart cards,
biometrics, etc. [3].
To improve security and be HIPAA compliant,
imaging centers and imaging departments (of hos-
pitals, clinics) must implement security procedures
and appropriate user authentication. With increas-
ing numbers of images/thermograms being trans-
mitted over the internet to physicians’ oﬃces, en-
cryption also is a key component in HIPAA compli-
ance [2].
The biometrics industry includes many hardware
and software producers. Standards are emerging for
a common software interface to enable the use of
biometric identiﬁcation in many solutions that pro-
vide security and positive identiﬁcation [4]. Shar-
ing of biometric templates and allowing eﬀective
evaluation and combination of two or more diﬀer-
ent biometric technologies is oﬀered by IDTECK
or Precise 100MC/200MC/250MC (ﬁngerprint and
Smart Card Readers) or SAGEM Morpho (ﬁn-
gerprint, facial and iris recognition). Interopera-
ble biometric applications and solutions are oﬀered
by Cross Match Technologies Inc. DigitalPersona,
or Precise 100MC/200MC/250MC which also of-
fers integration with Microsoft Windows Active Di-
rectory) [5, 6, 7]. These are just a few exam-
ples of leading global biometric identity software
and hardware (applications and solutions) produc-
ers.
2 Methods
We provided practical tests on 3 identical Hewlett
Packard HP notebooks (model 6735b) that had Win-
dows Vista Business operating systems installed on
them, and we interconnected 3 diﬀerent users in a
Local Area Network (LAN), within a time frame of
one month (February 2009). The biometric (ﬁnger-
print) Windows-based system environment was im-
plemented, and the logon and authentication activ-
ity of users using a ﬁngerprint instead of typing their
password were monitored by enabling success and
failure logon auditing in the Windows system’s Audit
policy.
The practical tests were provided within the
Clinic of Plastic and Aesthetic Surgery, Porta Med,
Ltd. Kosˇice (Slovak Republic).
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3 Capturing of ﬁngerprints
Fingerprints were captured using the integrated ﬁn-
gerprint scanning device (reader/sensor). The scan-
ning device is an input device that transfers the user’s
biometric information into electrical information and
then into digital information [8, 9, 10].
In Windows, the user must authenticate before
access is granted to ﬁles, folders, and/or applications
(on stand-alone clients, in Active Directory setups,
or some other network environment) [11].
Microsoft Windows assures security by using the
following processes: authentication, which veriﬁes
the identity of something or someone, and authoriza-
tion, which allows control of access to all local and
network resources, such as ﬁles and printers [12].
There are four scenarios associated with the ver-
iﬁcation task. Based on whether the identity claim
originates from an Enrollee or from a Fraud, the sys-
tem either correctly or incorrectly accepts or rejects
the identity claim [13] (Tab. 1).
Table 1: Biometric System Decision/Identity Claim
Biometric System Decision
Accept Reject
Identity
Claim
Enrollee Genuine
Accept
False
Reject
Fraud False
Accept
Genuine
Reject
Two steps are taken before a ﬁngerprint is used to
log on to Windows: (1) Register user’s ﬁngerprints in
Credential Manager, and (2) Set up Credential Man-
ager to log on to Windows. To register a user’s ﬁn-
gerprints in Credential Manager, at least 2 user’s ﬁn-
gerprints must be registered to obtain biometric sam-
ples (templates) with suﬃcient quality. This means
that the user must swipe the same ﬁnger slowly over
the ﬁngerprint reader several times, until the ﬁnger
on the screen turns green and the progress indicator
displays 100 %. The biometric templates were stored
locally on the hard drive of each laptop.
In addition, audit account logon events was
placed. This governs auditing each instance when a
user logs on with a swipe of his/her ﬁnger over the ﬁn-
gerprint reader. Auditing ﬁngerprint logon attempts
generates security events, depending on whether the
audit of successes or failures, or both (in our case we
audited both), is enabled. Success auditing gener-
ates an audit entry when an account logon process is
successful. Failure auditing generates an audit entry
when an attempted account logon process fails.
The events recorded in Event Viewer were used
to track each user’s logon attempt that occurred on
each HP notebook locally. The number of entries in
Event Viewer, when the accounts logon process was
successful and/or the accounts logon process failed,
were counted and analyzed.
4 Results
We have already mentioned that the system correctly
or incorrectly accepts or rejects the identity claim on
the basis of an identity claim. Thus we experience
four situations, as per Tab. 1: (1) True Positive –
Genuine accept an Enrollee, (2) False Positive – False
reject an Enrollee, (3) False Negative – False accept
a Fraud, and (4) True Negative – Genuine reject a
Fraud [13].
A measure of the performance of the biometric
system is its error rate, described by the False Ac-
ceptance Rate FAR (the probability that a biometric
system incorrectly identiﬁed an Enrollee or failed to
reject a Fraud), and the False Rejection Rate FRR
(the probability that a biometric system failed to
identify an Enrollee, or veriﬁed a legitimate identity
claim as a Fraud) [14, 15].
The False Acceptance Rate FAR is deﬁned as:
FAR =
Number of False Acceptances
Number of Fraud Recognition Attempts
(1)
The False Rejection Rate FRR is deﬁned as:
FRR =
Number of False Rejections
Number of Enrollee Recognition Attempts
(2)
At the point where FAR and FRR are equal, this
value is called the Equal Error Rate (ERR). This
value does not have any practical use, so we did not
calculate it. However, it is an indicator of the ac-
curacy of the device. For example, if we have two
devices with error rates of 5 % and 10 %, we know
that the ﬁrst device is more accurate (it makes fewer
errors) than the other. However, such comparisons
are not straightforward in reality [15, 16].
The number of entries from Event Viewer, in this
case ﬁngerprint logon attempts, when the accounts
logon process was successful and/or the accounts lo-
gon process failed (for each user on each notebook)
were collected, counted and analyzed. Tab. 2 and
Tab. 3 show the calculated FRR rates from the real
environment of three diﬀerent computers (but with
the same type of ﬁngerprint sensor/scanner), and
three users.
Although the error rates quoted by manufactures
(typically FAR < 0.01, FRR < 0.1, ERR < 1) may
indicate that biometric systems are very accurate, the
real situation is rather diﬀerent, namely the FRR is
very high (over 10 %). In our case, the FRR values
expressed as a percentage are in the range of 9.5 %
to 18.5 % (Tab. 4). This can sometimes prevent a
legitimate user (enrollee) gaining access. Thus we
must be very careful when interpreting such num-
bers/measurements.
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Table 2: Number of logins (successful, failed) for each
user/per computer (notebook), and calculated False Re-
jected rates FRR
Notebook Total logins
FRR
1 Successful Failed
User 1 46 8 0.142
User 2 57 7 0.109
User 3 66 7 0.095
Total 169 22 0.115
Notebook Total logins
FRR
2 Successful Failed
User 1 99 12 0.108
User 2 44 10 0.185
User 3 133 22 0.141
Total 276 44 0.137
Notebook Total logins
FRR
3 Successful Failed
User 1 65 8 0.109
User 2 71 9 0.112
User 3 89 14 0.135
Total 225 31 0.121
Table 3: Total successful and failed logins (user/per com-
puter), and False Rejection Rates FRR
Total logins
FRR
Successful Failed
User 1 210 28 0.117
User 2 172 26 0.131
User 3 288 43 0.129
Total 670 97 0.126
Tab. 4 shows the FRR rates for each user and each
computer/notebook (expressed as a percentage) out
of the total of authorized and failed access attempts
(ﬁngerprint used to log on to Windows).
Table 4: FRR rates in [%] (NB – notebook)
NB 1 NB 2 NB 3
User 1 14.2 10.8 10.9
User 2 10.9 18.5 11.2
User 3 9.5 14.1 13.5
The numbers of refused acquired attempts for
each user were counted in advance, and the Failure
to Acquire Rate FTA was calculated, as below [16]:
FTA =
Number of refused acquirement attempts
Number of all acquirement attempts
(3)
All acquirement refusals mean the inability of the
ﬁngerprint reader (sensor) to deliver the output data.
No software or log ﬁles were used to count these re-
fused acquirement attempts. Manual counting was
arranged by each user to count refused acquirement
attempts by the respective ﬁngerprint reader (sen-
sor).
The numbers of refused logon attempts for each
user (false reject of an enrollee) are shown in Tab. 5.
These are only informative results indicating how
many ﬁngerprint logon attempts were not enrolled.
The Failure to Acquire Rates (FTA) were also calcu-
lated, and are shown in Tab. 5.
Table 5: FTA rates
Acquired attempts
Total/Success.
and Failed
Refused FTA
User 1 238 40 0.168
User 2 198 32 0.161
User 3 331 52 0.157
Total 767 124 0.161
Tab. 6 shows the numbers of genuine acceptances
and false rejects and/or false acceptances and genuine
rejects in association with User 1 and notebook 1. A
false reject of an Enrollee is referred to as a type 1 er-
ror of identity claim or a False Positive, and/or False
acceptance of a Fraud is referred to as a type 2 error
of an identity claim, or a False Negative [13].
Table 6: The number of accepted and rejected attempts
associated for User 1 and notebook 1 (Note: the numbers
of accepted and rejected attempts of Enrollee/User 1 were
used from Tab. 1)
Accepted Rejected
Enrollee
46
True
Positive
(Genuine Accept)
8
False
Positive
(False Reject)
Fraud
1
False
Negative
(False Accept)
49
True
Negative
(Genuine Reject)
False Acceptance of a Fraud (False Negative) is a
possible error in the statistical decision process that
fails to reject enrollment when it should have been re-
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jected. In real-life applications, one type of error may
have more serious consequences than the other [7].
We measured the False Acceptance Rate FAR pa-
rameter for one user only (User 1) during his/her 50
login (recognition) attempts, when the user, instead
of enrolling with his “registered” ﬁngerprint (we used
index ﬁngers) provided some other “not registered”
ﬁnger(s). (Note: a not registered ﬁnger means that
the biometric samples/templates of the ﬁngerprints
had not been captured). In accordance with this part
of the test, User 1 passed the authentication (was
not rejected) once, which represents 2 % of the total
Fraud login attempts.
The False Acceptance Rate (FAR), as we men-
tioned above, is typically FAR < 0.01. As we have
shown in our measurements, where the FAR rates
were calculated as per (1), we had one false accep-
tance Fraud only (False Negative), which represents
2 % of the total number Fraud login attempts, thus
in this case the False Acceptance Rate FAR = 0.02.
Related calculations [13] from Tab. 6:
False Positive rate=
False Positive
(False Positive + True Negative)
(4)
False Negative rate=
False Negative
(True Positive + False Negative)
(5)
then
False Positive rate =
8
(8 + 49)
= 0.14 [or 14 %] (6)
False Negative rate =
1
(46 + 1)
= 0.02 [or 2 %] (7)
5 Conclusions
Utilizing ﬁngerprints for personal authentication is
becoming convenient and considerably more accurate
than current methods, such as the utilization of pass-
words. Fingerprints cannot be forgotten, shared or
misplaced. We have shown experimentally that the
use of biometric techniques (ﬁngerprint biometrics) is
not yet perfect, but is reliable and secure enough to
be used in log on to, e.g., personal computers (work-
stations) and/or networks to obtain proper data ac-
cess.
Some factors inﬂuence our results for authenti-
cation reliability (dryness or wetness of ﬁngerprints,
pressure, speed of ﬁnger swiping over the ﬁngerprint
reader, etc.) These factors inﬂuence the generation
of a unique template for use each time an individ-
ual’s biometric data is scanned and captured. Conse-
quently (depending on the biometric system), a per-
son may need to present biometric data several times
in order to enroll.
As regards ﬁngerprint-based methods, note that
the stored ﬁngerprint templates should not enable
reconstruction of the full ﬁngerprint image. In this
way, the system can comply perfectly well with pri-
vacy rules, so that it can only be used in co-operation
with the person who is enrolled.
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